retro: Session 7 — Phase 1 audit + gitea MCP credential overhaul
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Session7.md
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# Session 7
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**Date:** 2026-04-07
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**Focus:** Phase 1 audit + gitea MCP credential overhaul
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**Duration estimate:** ~1 hour
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## What was done
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### Phase 1 audit (luminos)
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- Audited the open Phase 1 milestone. Two issues already closed (cache schema work);
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one open issue #1 ("Add confidence fields to file and dir cache schemas") looked stale.
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- Verified `confidence` and `confidence_reason` are present in `luminos_lib/cache.py`
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(validation at L129–134, `low_confidence_entries()` at L191). Schema instrumentation
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is complete.
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- Closed #1 via REST `PATCH` (see MCP write notes below).
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- Phase 1 milestone now: **3 closed / 1 open** — only #54 remains, and it is real
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pending work (the agent prompt never instructs the model to set `confidence`, so the
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schema field is dormant in practice).
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### Gitea MCP credential overhaul
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The session opened with the gitea MCP authenticating as `mcp-service`, which had read
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access but not write access on `archeious/luminos`. Two failures triggered the rework:
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1. `mcp__gitea__issue_write method=comment` → `unknown method: comment` (the MCP
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doesn't expose comment creation under that verb).
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2. `mcp__gitea__issue_write method=update` to close #1 → HTTP 403 (mcp-service has no
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write permission on the repo).
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Sequence of changes after user direction:
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1. **Interim swap to `archeious` token** — replaced `GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN` in the
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user-scope MCP config (`~/.claude.json`) with `FORGEJO_API_TOKEN`. Verified by
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restarting the session and calling `mcp__gitea__get_me`.
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2. **User clarified intent**: all MCP writes should be done under the dedicated
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`claude-code` Forgejo user, not personal `archeious`.
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3. **Minted a `claude-code` token** — `claude-code` user already existed on Forgejo
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but had no usable password. Used the `archeious` admin token to PATCH the user
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with a generated password (via `/api/v1/admin/users/claude-code`), then basic-auth'd
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as `claude-code` to mint a token via `/api/v1/users/claude-code/tokens` with scopes
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`write:repository`, `write:issue`, `write:user`.
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4. **Granted repo permission** — added `claude-code` as a collaborator on
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`archeious/luminos`. Initially with `write`, then bumped to `admin` because
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write alone is insufficient to *delete* issues in Forgejo (only close).
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5. **Stored credentials** in `~/secrets`:
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- Removed obsolete `FORGEJO_MCP_TOKEN` (mcp-service)
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- Added `CLAUDE_CODE_FORGEJO_TOKEN` and `CLAUDE_CODE_FORGEJO_PASSWORD`
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6. **Updated user-scope MCP config** to launch the gitea MCP with the new token.
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7. **Updated `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md`** to reflect the new identity, the per-repo
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collaborator caveat, and a note that `issue_write method=delete` is not exposed
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by the MCP and requires REST fallback.
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8. **End-to-end verification** (after two session restarts):
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- `mcp__gitea__get_me` → `claude-code` ✓
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- MCP create: opened test issues #58, #59, #60, server recorded `user: claude-code` ✓
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- REST delete: 204 + GET 404 ✓ (used twice; the MCP cannot delete)
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## Discoveries and observations
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- **Forgejo issue deletion requires admin repo permission**, not write. `claude-code`
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has admin on luminos to make verification pass, but on other repos it'll only need
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`write` if you don't care about deletes.
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- **The gitea MCP server has gaps in its tool surface.** Confirmed missing:
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`issue_write method=delete`, `issue_write method=comment`. Both work via REST.
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- **Forgejo token endpoints (`/users/{username}/tokens`) require basic auth, not
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bearer tokens.** Sudo-as-admin doesn't help. The only way to mint a token for
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another user as admin is to set their password first, then basic-auth as them.
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- **`mcp-service` Forgejo user is now orphaned** — still exists but referenced
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nowhere. Should be deleted from the Forgejo admin panel when convenient.
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## Decisions made and why
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- **Use `claude-code` instead of `archeious` for MCP writes** — keeps a clean audit
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trail (commits/issues attributable to the bot identity) and limits blast radius if
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the token is compromised. Personal admin token stays out of MCP config on disk.
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- **Admin permission on luminos, not site-wide** — narrowest privilege that satisfies
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"must be able to delete issues for verification."
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- **Document the MCP delete gap rather than work around it** — patching the upstream
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gitea MCP server to expose `delete` is out of scope; a one-line REST fallback is
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cheaper and less brittle.
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- **Closed #1 directly after auditing**, didn't open a follow-up. The schema work is
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done; #54 already tracks the prompt-side gap.
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## Raw thinking
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- Phase 1 milestone is technically still "open" because of #54. Worth deciding
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whether #54 should land as part of a Phase 1 cleanup branch or get folded into
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Phase 3 (investigation planning) where the prompts are getting reworked anyway.
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My gut: fold into Phase 3, since touching prompts twice for the same area is wasted
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motion.
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- The MCP delete gap is annoying but small. If we end up needing it often (cleanup
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scripts, dedup, etc.) it might be worth opening an upstream issue against the
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gitea MCP server. For now, REST fallback is fine.
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- The `mcp-service` orphan is a smell. If we ever forget about it and it gets reused
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for something, we'll have two bot identities doing similar things. Better to delete
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it explicitly.
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- The "MCP can't comment, can't delete" pattern suggests the gitea MCP was built for
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the read+create happy path and writes beyond that are second-class. Worth keeping
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in mind before betting heavily on MCP-only workflows.
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- Did **no actual Luminos code work** this session — pure infra. Phase 3 is still the
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next real shipping target.
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## What's next
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Phase 3 (investigation planning) is the next shipping target. Concretely:
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1. **#54** — wire confidence-write into prompts. Cheap, unblocks the Phase 1
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milestone. Could be folded into the Phase 3 prompt rework.
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2. **#57** — refactor `_run_dir_loop` before Phase 3 dynamic turn allocation lands.
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Prerequisite cleanup.
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3. **#56** — dedupe `_TOOL_DISPATCH` / `_DIR_TOOLS` registration. Small, satisfying.
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4. **#55** — unit test coverage for ai.py pure helpers. Foundation for Phase 3
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confidence.
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5. Then Phase 3 proper (#19–#29 cluster).
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@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
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| [Session 4](Session4) | 2026-04-06 | Phase 2 + 2.5 complete (#4–#7, #42, #44), classifier rebuild, context budget fix, 8 PRs merged |
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| [Session 5](Session5) | 2026-04-06 | Documentation deep dive: new Internals.md code tour, Architecture cache fix, Roadmap replaced with pointer, PLAN.md status snapshot (#53) |
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| [Session 6](Session6) | 2026-04-07 | Extracted shared workflow/branching/protocols from project CLAUDE.md to global `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md`; moved externalize.md and wrap-up.md to `~/.claude/protocols/` |
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| [Session 7](Session7) | 2026-04-07 | Phase 1 audit (#1 closed, only #54 remains); gitea MCP credential overhaul — dedicated `claude-code` Forgejo user with admin on luminos, write+delete verified |
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---
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