Table of Contents

Session 7

What was done

Phase 1 audit (luminos)
Gitea MCP credential overhaul

Discoveries and observations
Decisions made and why
Raw thinking
What's next

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Session 7

Date: 2026-04-07 Focus: Phase 1 audit + gitea MCP credential overhaul Duration estimate: ~1 hour

What was done

Phase 1 audit (luminos)

Audited the open Phase 1 milestone. Two issues already closed (cache schema work); one open issue #1 ("Add confidence fields to file and dir cache schemas") looked stale.
Verified confidence and confidence_reason are present in luminos_lib/cache.py (validation at L129–134, low_confidence_entries() at L191). Schema instrumentation is complete.
Closed #1 via REST PATCH (see MCP write notes below).
Phase 1 milestone now: 3 closed / 1 open — only #54 remains, and it is real pending work (the agent prompt never instructs the model to set confidence, so the schema field is dormant in practice).

Gitea MCP credential overhaul

The session opened with the gitea MCP authenticating as mcp-service, which had read access but not write access on archeious/luminos. Two failures triggered the rework:

mcp__gitea__issue_write method=comment → unknown method: comment (the MCP doesn't expose comment creation under that verb).
mcp__gitea__issue_write method=update to close #1 → HTTP 403 (mcp-service has no write permission on the repo).

Sequence of changes after user direction:

Interim swap to archeious token — replaced GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN in the user-scope MCP config (~/.claude.json) with FORGEJO_API_TOKEN. Verified by restarting the session and calling mcp__gitea__get_me.
User clarified intent: all MCP writes should be done under the dedicated claude-code Forgejo user, not personal archeious.
Minted a claude-code token — claude-code user already existed on Forgejo but had no usable password. Used the archeious admin token to PATCH the user with a generated password (via /api/v1/admin/users/claude-code), then basic-auth'd as claude-code to mint a token via /api/v1/users/claude-code/tokens with scopes write:repository, write:issue, write:user.
Granted repo permission — added claude-code as a collaborator on archeious/luminos. Initially with write, then bumped to admin because write alone is insufficient to delete issues in Forgejo (only close).
Stored credentials in ~/secrets:
- Removed obsolete FORGEJO_MCP_TOKEN (mcp-service)
- Added CLAUDE_CODE_FORGEJO_TOKEN and CLAUDE_CODE_FORGEJO_PASSWORD
Updated user-scope MCP config to launch the gitea MCP with the new token.
Updated ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md to reflect the new identity, the per-repo collaborator caveat, and a note that issue_write method=delete is not exposed by the MCP and requires REST fallback.
End-to-end verification (after two session restarts):
- mcp__gitea__get_me → claude-code ✓
- MCP create: opened test issues #58, #59, #60, server recorded user: claude-code ✓
- REST delete: 204 + GET 404 ✓ (used twice; the MCP cannot delete)

Discoveries and observations

Forgejo issue deletion requires admin repo permission, not write. claude-code has admin on luminos to make verification pass, but on other repos it'll only need write if you don't care about deletes.
The gitea MCP server has gaps in its tool surface. Confirmed missing: issue_write method=delete, issue_write method=comment. Both work via REST.
Forgejo token endpoints (/users/{username}/tokens) require basic auth, not bearer tokens. Sudo-as-admin doesn't help. The only way to mint a token for another user as admin is to set their password first, then basic-auth as them.
mcp-service Forgejo user is now orphaned — still exists but referenced nowhere. Should be deleted from the Forgejo admin panel when convenient.

Decisions made and why

Use claude-code instead of archeious for MCP writes — keeps a clean audit trail (commits/issues attributable to the bot identity) and limits blast radius if the token is compromised. Personal admin token stays out of MCP config on disk.
Admin permission on luminos, not site-wide — narrowest privilege that satisfies "must be able to delete issues for verification."
Document the MCP delete gap rather than work around it — patching the upstream gitea MCP server to expose delete is out of scope; a one-line REST fallback is cheaper and less brittle.
Closed #1 directly after auditing, didn't open a follow-up. The schema work is done; #54 already tracks the prompt-side gap.

Raw thinking

Phase 1 milestone is technically still "open" because of #54. Worth deciding whether #54 should land as part of a Phase 1 cleanup branch or get folded into Phase 3 (investigation planning) where the prompts are getting reworked anyway. My gut: fold into Phase 3, since touching prompts twice for the same area is wasted motion.
The MCP delete gap is annoying but small. If we end up needing it often (cleanup scripts, dedup, etc.) it might be worth opening an upstream issue against the gitea MCP server. For now, REST fallback is fine.
The mcp-service orphan is a smell. If we ever forget about it and it gets reused for something, we'll have two bot identities doing similar things. Better to delete it explicitly.
The "MCP can't comment, can't delete" pattern suggests the gitea MCP was built for the read+create happy path and writes beyond that are second-class. Worth keeping in mind before betting heavily on MCP-only workflows.
Did no actual Luminos code work this session — pure infra. Phase 3 is still the next real shipping target.

What's next

Phase 3 (investigation planning) is the next shipping target. Concretely:

#54 — wire confidence-write into prompts. Cheap, unblocks the Phase 1 milestone. Could be folded into the Phase 3 prompt rework.
#57 — refactor _run_dir_loop before Phase 3 dynamic turn allocation lands. Prerequisite cleanup.
#56 — dedupe _TOOL_DISPATCH / _DIR_TOOLS registration. Small, satisfying.
#55 — unit test coverage for ai.py pure helpers. Foundation for Phase 3 confidence.
Then Phase 3 proper (#19–#29 cluster).